Incentives for competitive responses in large economies : a reformulation / BEBR No.907 by Rashid, Salim

UNIVERSITY OF
'^ BOOKSTACKS
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/incentivesforcom907rash

--^y).
FACULTY WORKING
PAPER NO. 907
Incentives for Competitive Responses in
Large Economies: A Reformulation
Salim Rsshid
M. Ali Khan
""WRVDFTM,:-
M!\
OAlTW
Co!lej;s of Commerce and Business Administratk
Bureau of Econcmic and Business Research
'J~lver;i^/ of IHinois. •"npa'ijP
^'','|:i!i'i:'^'''!;^'"SM''';rf4
BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 907
College of Conmerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
October 1982
Incentives for Competitive Responses in
Large Economies : A Reformulation
Salim Rashid, Associate Pro^^essor
Department of Economics
M. Ali Khan
Johns Hopkins University

Abstract
This paper extends some earlier results of Roberts and Postlewaite
on truthful revelation of preferences for economies with a finite number
of types and corrects their conclusions concerning infinite economies.

INCENTIVES FOR COMPETITIVE RESPONSES IN
LARGE ECONOMIES: A REFORMULATION
I. In 1976 D. J. Roberts and A. Postlewaite (hereafter RP) considered
the following question: Can an agent gain by providing the Walrasian
auctioneer with a "demand" curve that is not generated by his true
utility function? While it is well-known that such falsification is
possible and profitable in economies with few agents RP asked whether
the gains from such falsification went to zero as the number of agents
increased without bound. In the case of replicated economies they proved
that it is indeed the case that the gains from falsification went to
zero asymptotically. By an example, they next showed that there were
families of economies in which an agent could always gain a fixed amount
(in utilit}' terms, for some fixed utility function) by falsifying his
preferences. Finally, they provided a sufficient condition for families
of economies to provide asympototically zero gains from falsification
for any given agent.
The last part of the RP paper is, unfortunately, open to question.
To prove their major theorem, (Theorem 2) they consider economies with
a continuum of agents, in which all individuals are of measure zero,
hence negligile. Since our aim is to consider manipulation by indivi-
duals it seems odd to turn to a formalization in which individuals must,
of necessity, be negligible. We will provide a different proof of the
PJ* result for replicated economies, which will permit us to both gen-
eralize the result to any type economy as well as lead us to a general
condition for manipulation to be locally profitable. It will be seen
that the possibility of locally profitable manipulation depends upon
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the slope of the excess demand function rather than upon the continuity
of the equilibrium set correspondence. (We have been unable to find
global conditions for this problem, however.) Readers familiar with the
Roberts-Postlewaite paper will have no difficulty discovering our con-
siderable debt to them.
By formulating the question in a Nonstandard-Analytic framework it
can be shown that even in economies with an infinity of agents, (indeed,
an infinity equal to any preassigned cardinal) individuals can still
possess finite market power. This result is of course counter to our
intuition, which suggests that, with many agents in an economy, each
individual should have negligible influence. Intuitions however are
not proofs and need to be tested against rigorous analysis. What turns
out to be important is the concept of similarity: If there are many
agents "similar" to the agent in question then the agent will have no
manipulative power; if, however, the agent in question is of an isolated
type, an outlier, then his manipulative capacities need not vanish in
large economies.
Before proceeding, it is important to make a point that is theoret-
ically trivial but of significance in interpreting results on manip-
ulability. Suppose an economy has multiple competitive equilibria,
denoted, for the sake of simplicity by p^, ..., p. . In general, utility
of the manipulative agent, denoted a, will be higher at some equilibria
than at others. Let us relabel prices so that p^ gives a most utility
and p, least. If a now gives out a false demand function at pricesk
p^, ..., p, but his true demand function at price p, then p^ will appear
2
to be the unique equilibrium price vector for the economy. Even thougn
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a has given out his true competitive response at price p^ , it i*s clear
that a has manipulated the economy in order to provide an outcome favor-
able to himself. Since this is always possible in economies with multiple
equilibria and since uniqueness is quite rare, it follows that manipula-
tion will, in general, be feasible and profitable.
The description of the model is very closely adapted to that of RP.
Without loss of generality we make an observation that will considerably
simplify the analysis and also relax the boundary conditions imposed by
RP. The focus throughout is on the manipulative capabilities of agent
a. If all prices are positive, the possible responses of a, which will
be limited by his budget, will of course be bounded. If, on the other
hand, p =0 then either a has a satiation level z for this commodity,
n n
3in which case his response is again bounded, or his response will be
unbounded, in which case no competitive equilibrium can exist and we
need not consider such prices.
We consider pure exchange situations with a fixed number, N, of
commodities. In such situations, an economic agent is characterized
by his needs, his tastes, and his ownership of resources. These cha-
racteristics are specified mathematically by a (non-empty) consumption
N
set X C R a preference relation z on X, and an endowment vector
N
w e R . We will write -Ca), XCa) , and w(a), respectively, for the
preferences, consumption set, and endowment of an agent a.
N
Let P denote the standard unit simplex in R . The competitive,
price- taking response gives, for each possible agent and each price,
the set of net trades which are preference maximizing for the agent
given those prices. Formally, given a e A and p € P,
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C(a,p) = {zGR |z-x- w(a) and x is x^ (a) -maximal on X(a) subject
to px ^ pw(a)}. (Although we do not assume C(a,p) ^ 0, conditions suf-
ficient for non-emptiness of C(a,p) are well known. Note that C(a,p)
is closed for all a S A and p € P.)
To allow for deviations from passive price-taking behavior, we
permit agents to select responses to prices other than those specified
by the competitive response. Specifically, let L(a) denote the col-
N
lection of all correspondences S from P into R with the properties
that, for all p e P, s(p) + {w(a)} C X(a) and, if z £ S(p), then pz = 0.
We think of these correspondences as possible strategies an agent can
employ in departing from competitive rules; agents may adopt any form
of non-competitive behavior which can be described by a correspondence
from prices to net trades, so long as they do not violate their budget
constraints or the constraints imposed by their endox^nnents
.
A finite exchange economy is a finite collection of agents and an
assignment of a response correspondence to each. Thus, we can rep-
resent E as a mapping that assigns to each i in some finite index set
I a point (a., S.), where a. S A and S. € L(a^). Given an economy
E with response correspondences S , ..., S , we say that p G P is a
M
market-clearing price if there exist z S S (p) such that = E _ z .mm m—1 m
Denote by Q(E) the set of market-clearing prices for E. Note that Q(E)
is determined by the response correspondences S . If for each agent
a the response S is his competitive response, then Q(E) is just
m m
the usual set of competitive equilibrium prices.
Given the response correspondences of the other agents, an agent
a. can, by adopting a response correspondence S* other than that
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specified initially for him, effectively create a new "apparent economy"
E* in which (a., S.) has been replaced by (a., S*) . Generally, Q(E*)
will differ from Q(E) . We say that, given an economy E with response
functions S
, ..,, S and given an agent a, in E, a price p is
attainable for a. in E if there exists S* e L(a.) such that
e Z,^
^m^^^
"^ S*(p), that is, if p e Q(E*) for some "apparent economy"
which a. can effect,
1
We define the competitive response as individually incentive
compatible for an agent a in E if, for any consumption vector x attain-
able by a in E, there exists a competitive consumption y for a such
that y > (a)x.
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II. We begin by considering Replicated Economies. Let there be M types,
m = 1, . .
.
, M. We focus upon a particular agent a, of type M. True
excess demand responses will be denoted by z.. The false responses of
a will be denoted by y.
Theorem 1: If a's indirect utility function v(p) is continuous, then
his gain from misrepresentation becomes asymptotically zero in a sequence
of replicated economies.
Proof: Two proofs are given, the first one being a simplification of RP,
Let y, denote the false response in the kth replication and p' the re-
sulting equilibrium.
kz- + ... + kz T + (k - l)z + y,' =1 m-1 m k
or kz, +
. .
. + kz , + kz + y ' - z =0
1 m-1 m k m
y
'
- z
.
k m _
or z. + . . . + z + i = 0.1 m k
^k " \
^ as k -> <» because both y' and z are bounded,k km
Hence Zz.(p') -> as k ^ "or p' tends to an equilibrium price vector
p*. The continuity of v(p) now establishes the theorem.
Q.E.D.
For the second proof, let p' ?^ p* and {z'},y corresponds to p'.
zJ + ..,+z'=s: = since p' is not an equilibrium price.
In the k-fold replication.
kz ' + ... + kz ' T + kz ' = k£
,
1 m-1 M
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or kz^ + ... + k2^_^ + (k - l)Zj^ + y = ke - Zj^ + y(*).
If y(p') is a manipulative response,
kz,' + ... + kz' , + (k - l)z' + y = 0.
1 m-1 M
So ke - z' + y = 0, but I Ikcl I ->- "^ as k ->• °° while z' and y are bounded.
Hence any p' ^ p* is infeasible for large k, with is another way of
proving Theorem 1.
Q.E.D.
Before trying to generalize this result let us extract a property which
is useful later in characterizing local manipulability. If ED indicates
the aggregate excess demand and p' = p* + 6, then (*) implies
I |eD(p* + 6) - ED(d*)
— M - I I ^
slope as k ^ °°.
= kA ->• °= as k -> '=°. So ED has infinite
In order to generalize Theorem 1 it is worth considering the following
equation, (*) , again.
ke - Zj^ + y = 0,
which can be rewritten as
(Replicated response = ke) + (Non-replicated = y - z') = 0.
If the replicated response tends to infinity as the number of traders
increase, while the non-replicated response stays bounded, then the
argument of Theorem 1 can be repeated. Using Nonstandard analysis,
all this can be proved and we state it informally as
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Theorem 2 ; The number of types of agents is finite while the niimber of
agents is infinite. Let {1, ,.., M} denote those types which are repre-
sented in non-negligible proportions in the infinite economy and let
IL, denote the equilibrium price vectors for the finite economy con-
sisting only of types {1 M} . Then any price vector achievable
through manipulation in the infinite economy must lie infinites imally
close to 11^.
Proof ; See Appendix.
If agents who are similar demand similar commodity bundles, a sufficient
condition for this being strict convexity of preferences, then Theorem
2 can be extended to economies whose types are chosen from a compact
set. This result is formally stated in the Appendix as Theorem 3 and
proved therein.
Theorems 2 and 3 leave open the possibility that a trader who is an
outlier, i.e., one who does not have many traders similar to himself,
can manipulate an economy. Indeed, this is borne out by the RP example,
in which the agent who successfully manipulates is the only one with
his characteristics regardless of how large the economy becomes. The
importance of considering economies in which the number of types is
limited has been previously emphasized in treating the core equivalence
theorem and is now reached again in our attempt to formalize the intui-
tive idea that individuals become insignificant in large economies.
We now turn to discussing the difference between our approach and
that of RP.
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III. Let ED denote the aggregate excess demand of all traders except for
a. For manipulation to be feasible in an econoiny of any size,
ED(p) + y'(p) = 0.
Note that this condition is independent of the size of the economy and
there is no presumption that such an equation cannot be satisfied in
economies with many agents
.
Tneorem 4 ; If ED(p*) is continuous and has finite rate of change (=
derivative, when a derivative exists) , and if z (p*) is an interior
point of 2's consumption set then manipulation to achieve p", with
-6^ <_ p* - p' <_ 6 , is feasible. If z (p*) is a boundary point, then
only one-sided manipulation may be possible.
Proof : ED(p) is a continuous function of p. At p*, ED(p*) + z(p*) = 0,
or EDCp*) = -z(p*) . As p changes slightly from p* the choices for a
manipulative response y(p) , which consists of all vectors on the budget
line at prices p, move continuously. To put it differently, for
|p - p* I < 6, we can choose y(p) such that |y(p) - z(p*) | < e.
Hence, there exists a ^-neighborhood of p* such that ED(p) + y(p) = 0.
Q.E.D.
A diagram will help clarify the issue between RP and ourselves. In
the case of tr.m goods we can use Walras Law and consider only one
good, V7ith price P^
, as relevant to equilibrium. The line y(a)
indicates the upper limit to y^ (a) that can be purchased by a for
each p^. Obviously, values below this line are also feasible for
a, so the correspondence of feasible false vectors consists of every-
thing below the y(a) curve.
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FlfrvJRc 1.,
If -ED has the shape shown above then all the prices between
the two parallel vertical lines can be achieved by manipulation. The
proximate choice for a is a price vector p'.
Al Suppose as k -> «> the only feasible p' are such that |p' - p*| -> 0.
Then it is obvious that the continuity of V at p* will ensure limiting
incentive compatibility. A necessary condition for Al to hold is that
-EDCp*) has infinite slope at p*. It is not however sufficient, as
shown by the dotted line in Figure 1, which has local incentive
compatibility at p* but which nonetheless can be manipulated to get the
price vector p**.
Note however that the continuity of the equilibrium set correspon-
dence is not involved contrary to 5P, By the recent results of Sonnenschein,
McFadden et al we know that it is always possible to create an economy
with a specified excess demand function. By using these results we can
have ED as the same function for all k (and a constant correspondence
is of course continuous) . However, the diagram clearly shows that the
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same amount of manipulation remains possible in economies of arbitrary
size. This point had been clearly demonstrated by the RP example, but
they unfortunately blunt its impact by linking the example with the
continuity of the equilibrium set correspondence.
The intuition behind the R? result may be stated as follows:
1. 5 is an economy in which there is zero gain from misrepresentation.
2. ^ * E, and the equilibrium set correspondence is continuous.
3. Then the gain from misrepresentation must tend to zero as k -^ °°.
The questionable step here is no. 1. RP focus upon economies with
a continuum of agents. It is true that there is no incentive to mis-
represent in continuum economies according to the definition given.
However, and this is crucial, in the definition of equilibrium in Aumann-
Hildebrand economies, a set of excess demands is in equilibrium if its
average sum is zero. The earlier definition however required the exact
sum to be zero and in large economies the difference between t^Sz. ->k 1
as k -^ "o and Zz. = for all k is very great. Unfortunately, it is not
possible to evade average sums using measure theory and it is for this
reason that Nonstandard Analysis is a better tool for this problem.
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17. It has been argued in this paper that large economies are much more
open to manipulation than had previously been thought possible. If we
argue consistently that an equilibrium is defined by the aggregate excess
demand (and not the average aggregate excess demand) being equal to zero,
then an agent can always manipulate to his advantage if there are multiple
equilibria and it is possible for him to manipulate whenever there are
not "many" agents similar to himself. The weak point of the methodology
pursued above, which is identical to that assumed by Roberts and Postlewaite
in the first half of their paper, is its assumption that an individual
can have access to all the information needed for successful manipulation.
(This weakness is explicitly recognized by RP in footnote 4.) Indeed,
in conclusion, it may not be amiss to state a result that has a very
different flavor. If an economy is enlarged by drawing at random from
the space of agents characteristics then the excess demand functions
will all be identically distributed random variables. The aggregate
excess demand ED(p) will, by the Central Limit Theorem, be normally
distributed. If the manipulative agent chooses a false response y (p)
SL.
then the probability that y (p) = -ED(p) must be zero since the prob-
ability of a given point is zero for any nonatomic distribution. This
shows that unless the agent has access to very extensive information
the probability of successful manipulation is indeed very small.
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NOTES
In subsequent papers Roberts (2) considered the incentives problem
for an economy with public goods while Hammond (3) considered the same
problem for both private and public goods economies within a measure-
theoretic framework. We avoid the problem of public goods in this paper.
2
E.g., agent 2 could use the response Y(p) = D(p) + 6(p) where D(p)
is his true response and 6(p) =
|
jp - p
|
|
.
3
A direct argument establishes that an agent can never gain by
pretending to have an infinite demand for a good which he can be satiated
with.
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APPENDIX
The model is formulated as in the text of the paper except that
we now have w agents, with w £:*N - N, (For an introduction to Non-
standard Analysis see Robinson (5).) The space of agents characteristics
is topologized as in Hildenbrand (4) . The infinite economy is denoted
5 and the number of agents of type i is denoted N..
N.
Theorem 2 : If M = {i|— > 0} is finite and 11^ is the set of equilibrium
price vectors for the finite economy consisting of these M types. If p'
w I
is a price vector achieved by manipulation in 5 then p = IL..
Proof ; Since p' is achieved by manipulation z^(p') ... + z -(p') + y(p') = 0.
Collecting together terms for agents in M,
k(z,(p') ... + z^(p')) + I a.zAv') + y(p') =
^ " i=M+l
where k *N - N and 2.., z. correspond to those nimbers and excess
demands of those types not in M. Since Z il.z.Cp') + y(p') is bounded
k(z (p') + ... + Zj^(p')) is bounded. As k *N - N, z^(p') + ... + Zj^(p') = 0.
Hence p' is infinites imally close to being an equilibrium price vector.
Q.E.D.
In proving Theorem 3 we shall make use of the following well-known fact
about compact sets S. For all e > 0, there exists a finite set M, such
that only finite set of points do not lie within an e-neighborhood of
some member of M. The finite set M will be called the e-approximation
of S.
w
Theorem 3 ; If agents characteristics in E, are chosen from a compact
subset S of the space of strictly convex characteristics and M denotes the
e-approximation of S, for "small" e > 0, then any price vector p'
achievable through manipulation is infinitesimally close to being an
equilibrium price vector for agents.
Proof : From Hildenbrand (4) we know that agents whose characteristics
are close will chose commodity bundles that are close. Hence
z. +...+Z ,+y=0
1 w-1 •'
can be written as
(z;+^) + (z|+^) + ... + (z'+^) + ...
e £
(Z ' + -^r^ + ... + Z ' + -^ + Z.,_^^ + . . . Z + y =M 2 M 2^ ^^^ w-1 •'
where z' are the responses of the limit point types. This can be
rewritten as
Ek^.z,. + (5 + Z tz^. + y =
M+1 ^ ^
where — z .
w
The argument of Theorem 2 now applies as before.
Q.E.D.

!f
:;-''



HECKMAN
BINDERY INC.
JUN95
, , X PI ^ N, MANCHESTER

